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Abstract
This thesis describes the research of grading security in private Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) networks, and ultimately the development of “The Socialized.Net
Embedded – Cryptography Version” (Tsnecv). Tsnecv is a revision of  “The
Socialized.Net Embedded” (Tsne) which is the embedded version of Njål
Borch’s doctorate “The Socialized.Net”. Tsne is a P2P file sharing application
which builds it private P2P network as an Ad-Hoc or Distributed Transient
Network. Tsnecv focuses on applying different levels of security to the
network with respect to authentication of peers and access to resources,
primarily through the use of public key cryptography and assignment of
varying trust to peers that meet in the network.
The goal is to establish secure authenticated communications in such a way
that peers may be assigned different policies with respect to access of files and
resources, and in this way introduce different levels, or rather grade the
security and trust of other peers. An exiting feature is the possibility to use a
wireless device to perform a search among the files of all your friends’ and
friends’ friends, or other people you have passed by, and automatically having
your living room media PC stream the live audio. Files are accessed based on
user groups. Someone who forms an Ad-Hoc (spontaneous) network with your
wlan unit while passing you by, may autonomously assign you a low trust
level, and thus probably access to few or no files. Your close friends however,
may grant you access to everything but their most private files.
An important aspect was attempting a transparent integration between Tsne
and the new levels of security and the mechanisms used to obtain them. It was
attempted to inconvenience the users as little as possible, while keeping the
accessibility of available resources as high as possible for all peers, while still
allowing as much control as possible. Not only is it important to be able to
grade the security at different levels, but it would be nice if users did not have
to stop and ask each other for passwords, keys, secrets or to carry memory
sticks in case they meet someone new and interesting. In other words, to keep
the autonomy as intact as possible and the resources plentiful while allowing
peers to control access to their shared resources.
Public (as in asymmetric) key encryption was the choice of tool to achieve
authentication of nodes. Web Of Trust was used as a starting point for the
exchange of keys, but Tsnecv grades both nodes and networks at different
levels of security, so in some cases you may meet someone new and exchange
a key autonomously and publicly, but still consider the security of the key and
the association of an identity to the key strong enough to securely authenticate
a peer at a later time.
Keywords: P2P private peer-to-peer trust security access authentication
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1.  Introduction
1.1. Private Peer-to-Peer networks
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have grown popular due to their inherent
scalability and low cost. P2P file sharing networks are to a large extent open,
global networks, with very limited or no access limitations.
A specialized form of P2P networks, are private P2P networks. In a private
P2P network, only a limited selection of entities are granted access to the
system. For peers in some of these private P2P networks it may be desirable to
assign groups of selected entities different access restrictions, or policies. An
example of  a group is a person’s home computer, a media PC connected to a
television, a handheld unit and a portable computer. In such a closed group,
one might desire to share mp3 files, photographs and home movies among the
units without making them accessible to strangers. Another form of limited
group might be close friends and family, whom a peer wishes to grant access
to mp3’s, without granting access to other private parts of the files system.
There are many aspects to consider in such a system. Among them are: How to
include units in the limited group, how to limit access to the system and shared
resources, how to protect the exchange against eves dropping, and even the
consideration of whether or not it is desirable to protect this exchange .
1.2. Goals
This project will research which possibilities are available to secure private
P2P networks. Some known approaches  to security in systems with limited
access  are ‘Web of Trust’, certification through certificates based on
asymmetric public key cryptography (and a trusted third party) and other
cryptography based systems. Important aspects of all these systems are
confidentiality (access), integrity (authentication), and trust  (who can you
trust?). Some of the benefits one may achieve is control of to whom data is
published to, and guaranties of the integrity of data originating from trusted
nodes. For those who are interested in protecting themselves from frivolous
copyright infringement lawsuits of the type that is spreading over the world, it
might be an important aspect to be capable of securely limiting access to
private network to comply with current legislation.
It is the opinion of the author that one of the characteristics which makes P2P
networks popular is their autonomy. The peers generally does not need to
concern them selves with how other peers connect to the network. The peers
simply use the P2P application to access resources while the network grows
--
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and handles nearly everything else on its own. One of the goals will thus be to
retain much of this autonomy, while still allowing the security to be graded.
The question which will be researched is:
How may access to resources shared among peers in private Peer-
to-Peer networks be graded, in a secure manner, and with limited
intervention by the users.
With the rise of handheld wireless devices, more and more private networks
operate in so called disconnected mode, in other words, the networks are not
connected to the internet at all times (or maybe not at all). The users also has a
much more limited user interface than is normally found on a regular desktop
computer. There is often no mouse, only small keys, which makes it important
for a system to be able to handle as much as possible of the decision making
by it self. This project will thus have as one of its goals, to look at the
possibilities of securing private P2P networks, but at the same time be as little,
or not at all dependant on centralized servers.
A part of the project will be to further develop an existing P2P system in such
a way that the levels of security may be graded. Njål Borch developed the
system “The Socialized.Net Embedded” (Tsne). Tsne is an adaptation of his
doctorate , “The Socialized.Net”, designed specifically to stream mp3 (music
files) between peers in an Ad-Hoc network. The implementation of graded
security  will build on the analysis of the different possible approaches which
will be part One of this project. The implementation will be a specialized
form of the mechanisms that are researched for grading the security in private
P2P networks. Important aspects will be some of the things that are already
mentioned; access policies for limited groups, authentication, and trust. In
some instances you trust your friends’ friends, while other times, you might
only trust your friends, or maybe just your self and you own systems. In this
setting we will explore other implementations, cryptography, which entities
are trustworthy, suitable trusted authorities, and if we even need such
authorities in our system. The purpose of the developed system will not be to
produce a complete and functioning network. The implementation of Tsnecv
will be developed to enable experimentation with the different aspects of
security, and should enable us to observe how system grades security . The
system should have a fairly easy way of manipulating data which defines the
security of the system. By doing this, it will hopefully be possible to show
how choices that are made influence the security and autonomy.
--
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2. Background
2.1. Definitions
As Platoon once expressed, before something may be discussed, the
definitions of the topic at hand must be clear. The P2P technology is a
relatively new concept with conflicting definitions and ambiguities. In the
following subsections the authors usage of important terms will be clarified.
2.1.1. Ad-hoc and Distributed Transient Networks
The term Ad-hoc[3] networks are most commonly used about wireless devices
which spontaneously forms networks among them by connecting directly to
each other, and usually forming an overlay network. Ad-Hoc is however also a
suitable term for nodes on a local area network(LAN)[28]. which
spontaneously form an overlay network. Ad-hoc networks are a part of the
Distributed Transient Network(DTN) paradigm. The definition of DTN
networks is somewhat broader and is defined as: “the type of network which is
inherently decentralized by nature and consists mainly of nodes which are not
per se constantly a part of the network and are able to join or leave at any time
at any place in the network”[2].
2.1.2. Peer
A peer is one of many entities connected to a P2P network with a P2P
application. When referring to a peer it will be both the application and
inherently the user of the application that is being referred. In pure P2P
networks there are only peers. Other P2P networks rely on centralized servers
in one form or the other, or relies on concepts such as special peers referred to
as super nodes[29,30]. When concepts such as super nodes or servers are
discussed, they will not be referred to as peers.
2.1.3. Peer-to-Peer application
P2P applications allows peers to access resources other peers on the same P2P
network is sharing, and it allows peers to make resources available to other
peers. The resources are generally files which may contain virtually anything.
Modern P2P applications and protocols are sometimes more general and may
allow the routing of any type of data stream, such as text messages, voice
streams, video streams, and generally any other type of communication.
--
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2.1.4. Peer-to-Peer network
A P2P network is considered the entire system that allows peers to participate
in their sharing activity. It is the P2P application itself, the physical network
that allows the machines running the applications to connect, and all (if any)
specialized applications that may be acting as some sort of centralized server.
Some of these P2P networks rely heavily on centralized servers (even though
they may be replicated) for locating other peers and / or to perform searches or
even transfer files, especially  when problems occur1.  Other systems are
largely decentralized and it is usually the peers themselves that keep track of
and inform each other of the addresses of other participating peers. Such P2P
networks are generally referred to as overlay networks. This is because
searches and sometimes transfers follow a path routed among the peers, and
generally do not need an intermediate server for its basic operation. Still, these
systems relies on some sort of mechanism to allow new peers into the P2P
network for the first time. This mechanism may be as simple as posting the IP
address of a peer in the network on a website.
2.1.5. Private Peer-to-Peer network
In sections where only private P2P networks are being discussed, the wording
private P2P network will normally only be used the first time it occurs unless
it is probable that this could cause ambiguity. After that it will only be referred
to as network.
Private implies that the network is only available to selected peers. There are
many aspects of privacy, but in this setting it is used to describe a network
where only a selected group of peers are allowed access to the network and its
resources. Nothing is implied about how this group is selected, the anonymity
of the peers or the confidentiality of transferred resources, and most definitely
nothing is implied about attempts to conceal that something is being
transferred.
The distinguishing characteristics between P2P networks and more traditional
networking applications are diminishing and it is becoming harder to
distinguish a P2P network from applications like Windows Live Messenger,
some web sites, and even new concepts for advanced web browsers. To
alleviate this somewhat we require that the resources and infrastructures of
private P2P networks are provided by the peers. We also demand that there is
                                                
1 One such problem could arise when two peers are connected through a natural address
translation device. To avoid using some form of third party, the NAT devices would usually
need to be manually configured for incoming traffic to reach the correct host system. Even
then only one peer could  be connected to each NAT device (assuming the P2P application
relies on the use of default ports).
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some level of trust involved when a new peer is granted or gains access to the
network (otherwise one might possibly argue that it is only a cumbersome P2P
network).
As an example, the P2P network Direct Connect (DC) [8,9,10,14 ] is used both
as a regular P2P network and as a private P2P network. There are a multitude
of DC networks scattered around the Internet and the different DC P2P
networks entry points are centralized servers (hubs).  A peer connects to a DC
network by contacting2 one of these hubs, and is immediately ready to
participate in file sharing and chat rooms. The only difference between a DC
P2P network and a DC private P2P network is that the hub of the private
network requires a username and password before a peer is allowed access.
In private networks new peers are usually allowed into the network by an
existing trusted peer, and the new peer is usually considered as trustworthy as
the existing peer. Because the chain of trust has a tendency to grow over time,
this type of private network is generally suited for smaller groups of peers. In
some networks new peers will have to build trust over time, maybe by chatting
and transferring files, before they gain the same trust as any other peer (and
even then they may never gain the same trust). As we will see later on, there
are other forms of trust that may be suitable for granting access to a private
P2P network. In Tsne the trust is implied in the fact that peers have at one
point or another been connected to the same LAN . Nothing is implied about
the effectiveness of the security mechanisms many of these private P2P
networks use to protect themselves from unauthorized use or access.
The peers in private P2P networks are generally controlled by different users.
Even though one user may have a few peers connected at different locations or
different times, private P2P networks are suitable and intended for connections
between different users. This generally excludes the concept of sensor
networks[31] because these networks contain nodes controlled by a single user
or organization operating completely autonomously. Sensor networks are not
referred to as private P2P networks in this thesis. The security concepts
discussed may or may not be applicable for sensor networks.
2.2. Background
The author has always had a special interest in security systems. While
enrolled in elementary school (ages 6 through 13) he appeared in a radio
                                                
2 Selections of many public hub addresses are hosted on web servers that are pre configured id
the DC client. A DC client may select one or several of these hubs (depending on
implementation), or connect to hubs with addresses the user has obtained manually.
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program for children on one of two stations covering the entire nation3. The
program had a weekly spot to showcase the ideas of young innovators. In the
program he demonstrated an alarm system made of toy phones which were
wired together with switches and sensors to raise an alarm in different rooms
of the house if his room was entered or if his drawers were opened.
This interest was carried onto his interest for computer systems. One of the
first programs that was developed (on a Commodore Vic 20 computer with
built in support for Commodores implementation of the Basic programming
language) was a simple ciphering and deciphering program. It was not
sophisticated in any way, but it enabled him to store secret messages on his
computer, without the risk of the message being readable by anyone without
the secret key used for encryption.
After many years the author was introduced to the wonderful world of the
Internet. Few commercial businesses had begun to use The World Wide Web
(www) as a sales channel and the Internet as a whole was still, to a large
extent, reserved for academic institutions and people with a special interest in
computer science. This is how he entered the realm of Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) clients, File Transport Protocol (FTP), electronic mail (email) and
similar technologies.
It was immediately apparent to the somewhat ‘paranoid’ author that security
was a problem. Even defining security was problematic, but it seemed to have
similar properties with the protection of a room with an alarm made from a toy
phone, or limiting access to files, or at least limiting who could decipher the
content. On a regular basis someone was able to hack into the servers of the
local Internet provider (i.e. breach the security) and brag about reading the
contents of emails or listening in on IRC conversations. FTP servers which
were made available to friends continuously got visits from users who had
persuaded someone to give them the passwords, and even a few who had
obtained the password by performing a brute force attack4.
The number of networking applications grew at a fast pace in the following
years. Aside from the WWW, email systems, and a few others, a particular
type of application rapidly gained in popularity among users, namely file
sharing applications. A multitude of applications of this type exists, but during
the last years it is the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) applications that have become
                                                
3 The program was a weekly program for children called ‘Barnetimen’ (which would loosely
translate as ‘The hour for children’) and was broadcast on The Public Broadcasting Services
of Norway.
4 A brute force attack is an attack where a certain combination is needed (like a password) and
the combination is found by exhaustively trying combinations until the correct combination is
found.
--
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dominant.  In P2P applications the users (generally referred to as peers5) make
files of interest available and participate in a cooperative effort to exchange
the files effectively (some applications more successfull than others). P2P
networks has many resemblances with the WWW. It is most often files that
are moved across a network, and the exchange is generally open for all who
wants to participate. As the use of the WWW has broadened, security needs
has prompted solutions such as requiring login with passwords to restrict
access, the Secure Socket Layer  protocol combined with certificates to
provide authenticated and confidential communication, and many other
innovative solutions. However, in the extensive list of P2P systems the author
has experimented with, it seems as if the original intent of P2P, the
cooperative and effective distribution of content to all participants, has
somewhat clouded other needs and other uses for this technology.
One of the ingenious concepts of P2P is the autonomy. As soon as the
application is started, the peer has access to resources. Other peers come and
go, and with no interaction from the users standpoint all the shared resources
are available. But, it is the opinion of the author that many, if not most or all,
users have files they consider private and do not want to make available to all
other users of the P2P network they are part of. However, it isn’t improbable
that these same users might probably want to have remote access to these files
themselves, or maybe even grant a few selected peers access to some restricted
files. To illustrate this with an example we imagine the P2P system
‘Fastswap’. In this system peers are joining and leaving the network without
the need of asking other peers to accept them, it seems completely open just
like a regular P2P network. However, friends and acquaintances  may grant
each other access to files they do not want the rest of the network to see. In the
same system, a peer may own several machines and be connected to the
network from different locations (and appearing in the network as several
peers, one for each machine running Fastswap). These users may select to
grant special access to even more restricted files, their private files, only to
those peers they are running themselves. Maybe they even use the Fastswap
application to make other resources than files available.
One small step in solving such problems is a private P2P network. A private
P2P network distinguishes itself from a P2P network mainly by limiting the
user base and moving the responsibility for approving peers to either the
currently participating peers or a peer that is considered trusted. As stated it is
                                                
5 It is observed that in most contexts the distinction between the person who is using a P2P
application, the application itself or even the machine or network it is connected to is only
vaguely stated. Throughout this thesis a peer will generally be considered an instance of the
application executing on a single machine with access to a network adapter and a network. It
will not be considered important who is using the application (be it a human or some sort of
artificial intelligence). Only in selected sections where identity and authentication is discussed
will a distinction be stated.
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only a small step, but the basic assumption is that in such a network the peers
have some sort of relation with each other, they are not simply random peers
scattered around the virtual community of the Internet, and the peers are
somewhat stronger associated with an identity. Still, a more fine grained
control may be desirable. If this could be combined with the advantages of the
P2P technology, a new generation of P2P networks may begin to emerge. If
supply is a result of demand, the recent increase in the number of projects in
this field and the constant flow of advertisements promising secure P2P
services, this should be enough incentive for anyone with an interest to pick up
the torch.
The imagined Fastswap application gives rise to a need for security measures.
How may users be distinguished from each other ? How may one peer be
identified and authenticated by another peer ? How may malicious peers or
other entities be restricted from accessing the resources ? How is access to
different resources granted to different peers ? How may the autonomy of the
P2P application be kept as intact as possible ? These are aspects of different
levels of security that may be desirable in a given system. The developed test
system will be used to explore these questions, with a focus on graded access,
authentication and trust.
3. Problem
Several approaches for securing private P2P networks have been presented by
researchers. Some of these ideas have been implemented and some
implementations have been based on the developers own ideas. The most
striking feature of all of these is their diversity. A small network may find a
simple solution where peers connect directly to a centralized server favorable.
A single peer may have the responsibility of approving new peers, distributing
keys, and evicting abusers. Larger networks may favor a more distributed
approach where peers are allowed, at their own discretion, to invite new peers
they trust to the network. In other networks it may be some other form of
relation, such as location or presence, that allows users into the network, one
such system is Tsne. This diverse selection of systems and the diversity of
peers using them offers and demands different aspects security. Before we are
able to identify the complete scope of the problem, we must look at the
different levels of security that may be implemented and desirable in such
systems.
3.1. Levels of security
--
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3.1.1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is :”the concealment of information or resources”[5:pp4].
Access control is one of the mechanisms which is used in computer systems to
achieve confidentiality. While  information is moving from one system to
another over an unsecured channel, additional steps must be taken to retain
this confidentiality. The methods used to achieve this generally involves
cryptography. Another aspect of confidentiality is the concealment of the
existence of  resources (resource hiding) or transmissions of these resources.
3.1.2. Integrity
Data integrity and origin integrity refers to the trustworthiness of resources[5].
For data to have integrity it must be certain that it has not been subject to
unauthorized change. Data integrity applies to both stored and transmitted
data. Origin integrity  is more commonly referred to as authentication.
Authentication applies to the source of data, and cryptographic mechanisms
may be used to enable the receiver of data  to be certain who the original
source of the data was. In the setting of this thesis, where peers are generally
communicating through the public Internet, it is not the prevention of
unauthorized changes of transmissions that is important, but the detection of
such changes.
3.1.3. Availability
“Availability refers to the ability to use the information or resources
desired”[5:pp6]. For a system to be reliable it should be resilient against
actions or behaviors which deliberately or even inadvertently makes resources
that are supposed to be available inaccessible.
3.2. Threats
Threats are possible ways to attack a system. If the attack is successful it may
lead to use which violates the intended security[5]. Successful attacks breaches
the policies for one or more of the discussed security services, confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Successful attacks may result in some widely
recognized  problems [5:pp7]:
• Snooping
• Masquerading or spoofing
• Delay
• Denial of Service
• Unauthorized modification or alteration
--
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• Repudiation of origin
• Denial of receipt
3.3. Assumptions, trust and assurance
Systems which implement some level of security rely on the concepts trust and
assurance. Systems are never stronger than their weakest link and it is
important to identify which components (be it hardware, software, human or
other) represent a threat to this security. If a system is considered secure
because it has locked gate, the security may be breached if unauthorized
personnel has access to the key, or if the door is made of paper. If however all
personnel  who has access to the key is considered trusted and the door is
considered impenetrable, and these assumption are correct, the systems
security may not be breached. Of course this relies on a specification of the
security which states that the locked door should only be unlocked by
authorized personnel. If the intention is to keep the room behind the door
secure, the specification would also have to state that the room should only be
possible to enter through the unlocked door (and thus steps would have to be
taken to make this the only possible way to enter). This means that for the
intention of a security policy to be achieved, a specification which
implementation prevents all possible threats from breaching the security must
be stated. Because of this the security of a system relies on the assumption that
the specification is correct and includes all possible ways to breach the system.
3.4. Goals of security
According to Bishop[5], the proper specification of  a given security policy’s
secure and non secure actions or states allows for the implementation of
mechanisms which may prevent, detect or recover from attacks. When
designing a secure system it must be decided which of these mechanisms are
needed. For a home computer with no private files where the only security
policy involves availability of the files, a routinely complete backup routine
for the system (and procedures for restoring from backup) may be considered
a  sufficient specification of the security policy. In most systems the
specification is much more complex. In private P2P systems, private is an
important indicator of what the specification of the security policy should have
as its focus.
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The technology that is being researched is private P2P networks, and we are
looking at mechanisms for grading the security. Following the definition of a
private P2P network in section 2.1.5 an important characteristic is the
limitation with respect to which peers are allowed access. This is part of the
integrity security, specifically origin integrity, more commonly referred to as
authentication. The first problem that must be solved is a specification of  a
mechanism for a peer to be authenticated before it is allowed access to the
network. It would be preferable if this authentication was capable of grading
new peers according to the level of trust existing peers have in them. This
differentiation should attempt to be relatively autonomous  in order to retain
the autonomy which we must presume is at least partly responsible for the
prosperous spread of the P2P technology.
3.5.1.2. Identity
As explained, peers joining private P2P networks are generally invited by
peers who are already part of the network. When the joining peer connects and
the network attempts to authenticate it, the networks attempts to authenticate
the connecting machine, or at least the origin of the data which is being
transmitted. Identity and authentication is not the same. Identity may in the
scope of a private P2P network be described as the glue between the
authenticated node and the user controlling it. The identity doesn’t necessarily
identify a person by a name or other personal information, but the identity
allows others peers to at least differentiate between one peer and another. It
will be attempted to include some sort of applicable identity as a part of the
authentication mechanism.
3.5.2. Access
There would be little sense in grading peers during authentication if this
grading wasn’t applied to resources. Access is a part of confidentiality. This
second problem which needs solving is the specification of a mechanism
which makes resources accessible only to authenticated peers. If the thrust of
an authenticated peers is graded, the access to resources should also be graded
accordingly. As with the authentication, the grading of access should be as
autonomous as possible to retain the autonomy of  the overall system.
3.5.3. A note about autonomy versus control
Autonomy and control are largely opposite characteristics. In section 3.5.1 we
made the assumption that the autonomy of P2P networks is a contributing
factor in their wide spread use. If this assumption is correct it follows that with
two identical systems only differing in the amount of manual operations
involved in accepting new peers, the one with the fewest operations is the
superior one (at least from the peers viewpoint). However, this thesis
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researches private P2P networks, which differs from regular P2P networks
mainly by the control of who is granted access. Balancing autonomy and
control implies a tradeoff  where the control comes at a cost of reduced
autonomy. The researcher will do his best to limit the reduction of the
autonomy.
3.5.4. Focus
Among the aspects of security that are not the focus of this thesis, even though
some of them will be discussed briefly,  we mention some important ones:
concealment, data integrity and availability. From this it follows that among
the mentioned threats the concepts delay, denial of service, unauthorized
modification or alteration (of stored data), repudiation of origin and denial of
receipt are considered less important than snooping, masquerading and
spoofing. This thesis will rather focus on the concepts of access (a part of
confidentiality) and authentication (the origin integrity part of integrity).
Access and authentication are considered important because they are very
basic to the operation of keeping networked communication private.
3.5.5. Motivation
A multitude of projects related to P2P networks are under constant
development and new projects and ideas are presented. In the authors opinion
none of these have sufficiently fused the autonomy of  the regular P2P
networks with the control associated with private P2P networks. It seems as if
the focus of private P2P networks is either networks that hides the origin of
data (like Freenet[19,20] where the origin of resources is concealed, or the
more common private P2P networks like those based on the Direct Connect
technology [8,9,10,14] or Torrent networks where all resources are available
to all peers and the invitation to enter is only one of many obstacles. This was
the motivation that led the researcher to the task of researching a technology
which will hopefully make the development of an application with the control
of a private P2P network but the autonomy, broad user base, and resource
availability of a regular P2P network possible, or at least bring the two
branches of the P2P technology a few steps closer together. From the authors
view point, grading in the authentication process of peers and grading of
access, both in more autonomous fashions than the current technology is
capable of,  are the first steps towards a diminishing gap between these two
branches of the P2P technology.
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4. Related work and technologies
4.1. Security approach for network applications in a Peer-To-Peer
perspective
With the capabilities of many current communication devices, spontaneously
creating networks (Ad-Hoc networks) or other networks with transient
properties, using P2P technologies get a broader application. When someone
walks around with their mobile device with its Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) or Bluetooth turned on, the device will meet many other devices. If a
device can control another or access its resources, it becomes obvious that the
level of security or policies in many cases should be different. For example the
security needs are different when a mobile meets the media PC of its owner,
than when the mobile meets ‘Joe Shmoe’ in the street or while connected to
the Internet. Private P2P networks has some of the same characteristics as
walking around with a network capable device. Some of the peers you meet
are people the user knows, while others may be complete strangers, included
in the network by a friend of a friend, or someone along a chain mixed of
acquaintances and strangers. In this chapter we will discuss how current
technologies has attempted to solve the challenges of the different levels of
security discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter is divided in two parts.
The first discusses security mechanisms such as passwords and cryptography.
The second discusses how these security mechanism are used in the current
private P2P technologies and which levels of security the mechanisms are used
to achieve.
4.2. Security mechanisms
As discussed in chapter 3, security  is based on three concepts,  confidentiality,
integrity and availability. As stated  in section 3.5.4, the focus of security in
this thesis is on the concepts of access (a part of confidentiality) and
authentication (the origin integrity part of integrity). The following describes
technologies for providing these levels of security. Only concepts that are
considered somewhat effective will be discussed. For example, controlling
access by not publicly distributing the IP address or hostname of a centralized
server will not be discussed as access control.
4.2.1. Basic access and authentication mechanisms
Private P2P networks grants access to selected peers. The network uses an
authentication mechanism to authenticate these selected peer and then grants
access to some or all resources in the network.
4.2.1.1. Secrets as authentication
An unsophisticated system may use the common approach to access of simply
requiring that a peer has the knowledge of a secret, like a password. This
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secret may be a shared password for all selected peers (identifying the peer as
belonging to the group of selected peers), or a specific password  for this exact
peer (identifying the peer as a specific peer belonging to the group of selected
peers). If the system is more advanced it will use encryption mechanisms to
prevent attackers from snooping the password and masquerading or spoofing
the identity of the peer. In both cases a routine for the initial assignment and
exchange of the password (shared or specific) must be in place.
4.2.1.2. Locality as a form of authentication
At least one private P2P network relies on locality for authentication. A
system like Tsne (discussed in the next chapter) grants initial access to peers
which are present on the same LAN, and the network is thus considered
private for peers on this LAN (even if the LAN is connected to the Internet).
Tsne allows peers which has once met on a LAN to connect to each other
through the Internet at a later time. At that point Tsne authenticates peers only
by their supplied node ID, which makes spoofing a relatively trivial attack on
the system6.
4.2.2. Cryptographic mechanisms for access and authentication
Private P2P networks aiming for higher levels of security uses advanced
cryptographic concepts to achieve this security. An advanced cryptographic
system is able to authenticate nodes in such a way that the success of an attack
on the cryptographic part of the system becomes infeasible with the resources
that are available.
When the public keys of entities are known, cryptographic systems like RSA
may be used to authenticate and provide secure communication [6,7].
However, in systems where keys are not previously known, two devices or
systems which haven’t meet before has the problem of how to exchange their
first keys securely. In an encryption system where authentication is a
necessity, common solutions include manual distribution of the keys (which
are linked to some form of identity), and exchange aided by a trusted third
party, sometimes combined with certificate signature schemes.
4.2.2.1. Manual exchange
Manual exchange is often referred to as out of band exchange. This means that
the encryption system relies on the keys to be distributed through a separate
                                                
6 There are many other challenges related to access and authentication in Tsne, but these will
be described in detail in the design and implementation chapters.
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mechanism. This includes solutions like delivering the key by phone, mail,
email, floppy disks, other portable storage devices, and several others. It is
noted that for the security of the system to be kept intact, the confidentiality of
the key itself must be assured.
4.2.2.2. Trusted key servers
Trusted key servers stores the keys of all or a large group of the peers in the
network. For a peer to acquire the key of another peer, it only needs to know
the key or keys of the trusted key servers. This alleviates the problem of
distributing keys, but introduces the problem of a single point of failure in the
trusted key servers. For a private P2P network that already relies on
centralized servers this is not necessarily an added disadvantage, but for pure
P2P systems a centralized trusted key server will add an unnecessary  point of
failure, affect scalability, and also the need for administration of the server.
4.2.2.3. Certificate Authorities
Another solution is the use of  public key cryptography based digital
certificate servers, also known as certificate authorities (CAs)[6]. The CA has
at least one known public key, which is distributed with applications that has a
need for secure communication. Using public key cryptography like RSA and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, the CA creates a certificate for a device (like a
web site or a peer) that needs to identify itself. The simplified explanation of
the process involved when generating a certificate would be to take the
device’s public key, some additional info like a Universal Resource Locator
(URL) of a web site or some sort of naming representing a peer, packing it
together, hashing it, and finally signing the hash with the CA’s private key[6].
The certificate may be used to establish both a secure communication channel
between peers who have never met or exchanged keys, and to authenticate
peers who is attempting to access a private P2P network. The advantage of
certificates compared to a trusted key server, is that the peers themselves
exchange the certificates, it is only the creation of the certificate that must be
done by the centralized servers.
4.2.2.4. Web of Trust
In a web of trust friends have established authenticated communication
channels. Peers trust their friends or friends of friends (and so on) to supply
the proper key and information about people their friends have the means to
establish a secure connection with, but whom the peer does not have a key or
certificate for. In its simplest form, a web of trust is used only to supply the a
peer with the needed information to establish a secure connection with a friend
of the friend. In this type of network there are only two levels of trust. A peer
trusts their friend, and the peer selects to trust any friend of the friend because
their friend trust the friend of the friend. In some specifications and
implementations, intricate webs are created by chains of trust spanning many
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levels of friends of friends of friends and so on. Because a security system is
only as strong as its weakest link, shorter chains of trust are arguably more
secure. However, longer chains of trust increase the number of peers that may
connect securely without some form of out of band key exchange.
4.2.2.4.1. Web Of Trust in PGP
In PGP a web of trust (WOT)[32,33] provides authentication and secure
communication based on public key cryptography and certificates from a
network of trust. The WOT does not depend on a central CA, even though
WOTs often have several data bases where many certificates are stored. In a
WOT devices that meet use their keys to sign each other’s certificates. They
also add each others list of certificates they trust to their lists of trusted
certificates. Gradually as a certificate gets more signatures and the certificate
propagates to more devices that trust this certificate, the WOT grows. It is the
intention that a route to a destination should always be possible to find. By
route we mean a way for two devices who want to communicate, but haven’t
signed each others certificates, to find a combination of certificates with their
associated lists of certificates they trust, which will prove that the two
respective certificates of the devices are legitimate. The web of trust is built on
the foundation that a device will most often know a device which knows a
device who knows a device (and so one), which finally knows a device which
has meet and trusted the device with whom one wants to communicate. Before
a choice is made to use a certificate scheme like the one in used in PGP or a
simpler version, the tradeoff between the increased number of devices that
may be authenticated and the lessened security resulting from a long chain
should be considered.
4.3. Cryptographic algorithms and protocols
Cryptographic algorithms and protocols form the basis for modern secure
networking applications. Cryptography is a broad and advanced field which
involves many advanced topics including mathematics sometime beyond the
comprehension of most computer scientist. Proving the correctness of an
algorithm or protocol and the associated assumptions that are made when
specifying their security often requires years of work and the combined effort
of hundreds of researchers. This thesis does not focus on the inner workings of
cryptographic algorithms, but will in the following introduce some of the
important concepts, particularly cryptographic algorithms that are in broad use
today and details related to protocols that are relevant to authentication.
4.3.1. Symmetric cryptography
Algorithms for symmetric cryptography use the same key for encryption and
decryption. All current renowned symmetric algorithms use block ciphers to
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encrypt and decrypt. Block ciphers only encrypt one block of a message at a
time, consuming a fixed number of bits for each block (with 128 bits being the
block size of current block ciphers). According to Ferguson and Schneier[6] a
block cipher may be visualized as a very big key-dependent table. For every
key there would be a table that map the plaintext to the ciphertext. For a block
cipher with 128 bits this table would contain 5 .1039 bytes of data. The highest
achievable bit security of a n-bit block cipher is the limit n bits. All ciphers
have limitations and vulnerabilities (such as certain keys which are considered
weak because the allow certain types of statistical attacks and thus are
excluded) which reduce the actual bit security slightly.
4.3.1.1. Advanced Encryption Standard
The block cipher ‘Data Encryption Standard’ (DES) has long been an
encryption standard but the encryption is easily broken with current
resources[6]. The United States (U.S.) government  uses the ‘Advanced
Encryption Standard’(AES)[6] which is considered secure in years to come[6].
Other block ciphers (like Serpent) which are considered more secure (by most
serious cryptographers) exist[6], but due to other factors such as speed, ease of
implementation and the strong position of the U.S. government and trust in
their evaluation of the AES specification, AES is the de-facto standard. One
large advantage of using AES for symmetric encryption is the fact that it has
undergone a huge amount of scrutiny and analysis.
4.3.2. Asymmetric cryptography
Algorithms for asymmetric cryptography, also known as public-key
encryption, use two separate keys for encryption and decryption. In its general
use, the private key is used to encrypt a message or cleartext to ciphertext, and
the public key is used to decrypt the ciphertext to cleartext. The current
algorithms are mathematical calculations where knowledge of the public key
reveals nothing of the private key. Some of the algorithms may be used to
provide both digital signatures and public-key encryption. Digital signatures
are very useful for systems that has a need for authentication.
4.3.2.1. RSA
The RSA[23] algorithm, named after its inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir
and Leonard Adleman, was published in 1978. According to Ferguson and
Schneier[6] RSA relies on a mathematical concept known as a Trapdoor One
Way Function. Johnsen[7] explains the security of RSA in terms of the
complexity of factoring large primes and modular multiplication. In an RSA
system an entity uses the mathematical algorithm to generate a key pair
consisting of a public and a private key, and the public key is published.
Anyone may use this key to encrypt cleartext to ciphertext. Even though
everyone has access to the public key, only the entity which produced the
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private key will be able to decrypt the ciphertext to cleartext. This allows
anyone to produce encrypted messages which may only be decrypted by the
desired entity (given that the authenticity and data integrity of the public key is
secure). If the private key is used to encrypt a cleartext, decryption with the
public key will result in the cleartext. It may seem of little interest to encrypt a
message in such a way that everyone (because everyone has access to the
public key) may decrypt it. However, this property allows RSA to be used in  a
signature scheme, and allows the owner of the private key to sign messages,
which in turn allows recipients to confirm the authenticity of the sender.
A strong competitor for the RSA system is Eliptic Curve
Cryptography(ECC)[34]. ECC is probably secure or even more secure than
RSA (assuming of course that for both systems the keys that are said to
produce the same calculated bit security is used). The advantage of ECC is
that the increase in the length of the key required to increase its bit security,
grows much slower than it does for RSA. RSA is considered safe for many
years to come, but the U.S. government has already switched to ECC (which
means cryptographic systems that are purchased by them must use ECC not
RSA). The problem with RSA is that it will not be possible to produce keys of
sufficient length some time in the foreseeable  future. Because the required
keys for similar bit security in ECC are much shorter, ECC will outlast RSA.
For developers there is sometimes no choice to be made. ECC is a new
technology, and unless the developer intends to implement the internals of the
cryptographic parts of the system, RSA is often the only available (of the two
competitors) cryptographic solution for the development platform. There are
of course other public-key solutions, but RSA is probably the most widely
used and best known of them all[6]. As with AES, RSA has undergone a huge
amount of scrutiny and analysis after it was published.
4.3.3. Theory of Authentication protocols
Authentication protocols allow entities to confirm the origin integrity of data.
In a private P2P network, public-key cryptography may be used to both
authenticate an entity (e.g. a peer) and to establish a secure channel for
communication over an unsecured network.
There are several approaches to the implementation of authentication using
public-key cryptography and signatures. Ferguson and Schneier[6] explains
RSA signatures. Current hashing algorithms are much faster than encryption
with RSA. Hashing a message and signing only the hash has both performance
and security advantages. In addition RSA can only encrypt or sign bitstrings
that are shorter than its key (actually key length in bits minus 1), so signing a
message which was longer would require some sort of mechanism similar to
cipher block chaining[6] to split the message into sequences of proper length.
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Using the commonly known abstractions of entities in the cryptographic











(AliceChallengeResponse)  ) ->
“I’m Bob” or “I’m Alice” are expressions of some sort of permanent and
usually unique identifier for a peer. Bob and Alice hash and then encrypt the
hash of the challenges, challenge responses, identities and the symmetric key
for future communication. When the messages are received and decrypted, the
receiver hashes the information shown on the last line in each stage above.
The signature on the first line in each stage is then verified against the
produced hash and the public key of the sender. If any part of the message has
been changed by an adversary, the signature verification will fail.
Eve has the ability to snoop and change the contents of exchanged messages.
Because the messages are encrypted with the public keys of the recipients,
only the intended receiver may decrypt the challenge and give the correct
response. If the challenge is answered correctly Bob has authenticated Alice,
and vice versa. If the symmetric session key supplied by Bob is used for
further communications, the content of the communication will be secret from
anyone else than Bob and Alice. Cryptographic systems are intended to secure
in different ways. Depending of the specification of the security the exact
protocols may have important differences. For example, it is usual to use some
form of mechanism to defeat replays of messages. For example, part of the
encrypted message may be a sequence number or a time stamp. Handling of
out of sequence or untimely messages depend completely on the demands of
the systems security. A very useful part of properly authenticating peers and
handling exploits such as replays, is that attackers or malicious peers are
unable to spoof the user identities of offline peers to gain access to resources
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and privileges intended for the spoofed peer. If the exchanged session key is
used for communication, even if an attacker has acted as a man in the middle,
the only thing which is revealed is the presence of the communication, not the
meaning of its contents.
4.4. Grading of security in current private P2P networks
In this section we explore different private P2P networks to discover if the
security of the network is graded, and how this is achieved. As our definition
of a private P2P network states that access is granted to selected peers, any and
all networks we discuss has at least graded access security at two levels. Either
a peer is granted access, or the access is denied. It is not necessarily how
secure the network is that is explored. It is rather the ability of the network to
use differentiated levels of security for both access and authentication.
The grading of the security which is to be designed in the next chapter will be
done in an existing system which is a private pure P2P network, i.e. it has no
centralized servers. The existing technology in these types of networks will be
of special intrest. The very recent survey of private P2P networks by Roger
and Bhatti [1] is an informative starting point for information about such
networks. A representative selection of current private P2P networks such as
those surveyed here will be presented in the following. The networks will
however be analyzed with respect to grading of security instead of topologies,
search routines, discovery, etc.
4.4.1. Direct Connect
In the direct connect (DC)[8,9,10,14] network, peers connect to a centralized
server referred to as a hub. Searching is done by querying the hub which stores
the file lists of all online peers. When a peer requests a file it is redirected to
the peer that is hosting the given file, and downloads it directly. Direct connect
is more a protocol than a single application. Many versions and variations of
implementations exists. Aside from the original DC system by NeoModus,
which spawned the reverse engineered version ‘open direct connect’, the
probably most well known is DC++[10]. DC++ allows peers to connect to
several hubs (and thus networks) at the same time. In the DC communities the
hubs also serves a chat room where peers may socialize, and through the hub
users may also create private chat rooms.
In its original form, the servers were controlled by one peer and there were no
restrictions to access the network. With newer versions of the hubs like
YnHub[11], private networks are created by requiring a password from
connecting peers, normally one password per peer. The key is exchanged out
of band. There is no cryptographic authentication of the peer. This makes
spoofing of user identities a real threat for private DC networks.
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4.4.2. Octopod
Octopod[12] is in some ways the least autonomous and most restrictive of the
discusses technologies. The system consists of peers running the same
application. Keys are exchanged automatically through a distributed hash
table[13](DHT), but must sometimes be exchanged manually. Each peer
creates one or several share directories. For any peer to be granted access to
this share, the sharing peer must manually add the peer who is being granted
access to the share. In addition, for a peer who is granted access to be able to
access the files in the shared folder,  a share ID must be delivered out of band
from the sharing peer to any peer which is granted access. The Octopod
network is probably secure, but the cumbersome addition of peers to shares
will make the growth of the network slow, and the extremely restricted
environment may arguably be closer related to group ware than a regular
private P2P network. The access may however be graded at any level. A
sharing peer may add all peers to a single share, in addition to granting access
to specific shares to a few or one single peer. It is not possible to add all peers
to a single share automatically.
4.4.3. Waste
The WASTE[15,16] networks consists of several completely separate groups
of peers running the same application. In each network (group) peers use their
group ID in combination with their user ID when connecting other peers to
avoid inadvertent joining of the different networks (traffic from foreign group
IDs are ignored). The connections between peers are encrypted using a
common key. Communication between the peers is secure, granted that none
of the peers disclose the key to a third party. There is no method of
authenticating individual peers. The IP address of a connected peer is required
to connect to the network the first time, but IP addresses of participated peers
are propagated through the network once a peer connects to the network, and
the IP address of peers are updated when they connect from new addresses.
Even though the initial connection procedure is somewhat advanced, the
further use of the system is simple. Files may be pushed to specific peers, and
shared files of other peers may be browsed and downloaded. Except from the
manual pushing of files there is no grading of access, nor authentication of
peers. Even though the connections between peers are encrypted, each
intermediate peer may decrypt the passed messages, allowing snooping and
spoofing.
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4.4.4. Retroshare
Retroshare[17] (and several similar systems which are omitted because they
rely on a web service controlled by unrelated third parties) uses cryptography
to establish secure channels between peers who are friends. Files are
transmitted directly between friends, or through an intermediary common
friend when strangers communicate (and only if such a common friend exist).
Retroshare does not rely on a centralized server in the control of a third party.
Retroshare achieves this through the use of a DHT. The public keys of a peer
is packed in a certificate. This certificate is then signed by friends. The signed
certificates are distributed through the DHT, and as the number of signatures
on each certificate increases, it becomes more likely that a joining peer will
only have to obtain a few signatures out of band before it may  connect
securely to most of its friends. Certificates that are signed by a friend (who is
supposed to have established the identity of the certificate owner) may be
signed in band. The certificate/signature scheme is a variation of a web of trust
(discusses earlier in this chapter).
 Friends are generally peers who have some social connection. Peers who are
not friends but share a common friend may communicate through the secure
channel that is created by their two separate secure channels to the common
friend acting as an intermediary peer. These types of private P2P networks are
from the average users viewpoint very similar to applications such as the MSN
messenger.
The Retroshare documentation is ambiguous. At one point it states that only
communication between friends is safe, while at another it states that files are
only visible and accessible to friends and to  friends of friends who are granted
access through the auto discovery mechanism. The ambiguity probably has to
do with the Retroshare team’s definition of secure. The access and visibility of
the files are only available to friends and friends of friends, but it is not
considered “secure” to transfer a file to or from a friend of a friend. It is
assumed that they intend to express that if you transfer something to someone
you don’t know, it is not always wise to trust your friends judgement of the
intentions of this friend of your friend. Grading of access is very limited. Files
are either shared or not shared. If a peer is considered a friend, access is gained
to all files. If a friend of a friend connects through the auto discovery
mechanism, the sharing peers must either grant access to all or no files. Only
strangers who are friends with a common friend may connect through the auto
discovery mechanism.
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4.4.5. Turtle
Turtle[18] uses password mechanisms to generate and distribute keys. In
Turtle friends who want to authenticate for the first time use out of band
communication to agree on a question they both know the answer to. The
answer, which is not revealed or exchanged, is used to generate an encryption
key. This enables the two friends to authenticate each other securely. The use
of a public question with a secret answer based on a social relation may
increase the security, because snooping of the out of band communication will
not automatically reveal the key. The opposite may also be true. Because users
will trust the scheme, they may be more likely to use channels that are less
secure than they normally would to agree on a question. Where a physical
exchange may normally be used, regular email or a chat client may be used
when users rely on the concept. This could decrease the security, especially if
attackers have a social relationship with the peers, because they are more
likely to make educated guesses (or even know) of the answer to the publicly
discussed question.
4.4.6. Freenet
Freenet[19,20] is not a private P2P network by it self. Freenet uses a
combination of signatures of data and signatures of pseudonyms of the peer
which inject data. The Freenet network effectively conceals the origin of data,
and only allows a peer which holds the private key of the signatures to inject
data under the given pseudonym. The injected data is distributed among the
peers in the DHT according to a stochastic algorithm. Peers in the network are
not able to determine if a file is being injected in the part of the DHT they are
responsible for, or if the data is simply being redistributed to increase the
availability. It is noted by the author that because the network is completely
open, attackers may use multiple identities and thus there is the possibility that
a statistical attack to reveal publishers of data may exist.
To use Freenet as a private P2P network, the peers agree, out of band, on a
pseudonym to use when injecting data. They also share the knowledge of the
private key. To keep access security, the data must be encrypted before
injecting it in the network (otherwise all peers may access it), so an additional
encryption key must also be shared in the private P2P network. To clarify, any
peer may access all files in a Freenet network, but peers who want to use this
same network as a private network, takes some additional steps. They encrypt
the data before they inject it, they use a key they have agreed on, and they
have also shared the knowledge required to publish data under a pseudonym,
and this pseudonym identifies the data they are going to share among them.
The Freenet is considered effective in its concealment the origin of data.
Groups of peers who want to use it as a private P2P network basically have to
use some sort of out of band communication to distribute the secret keys to
new peers who are invited. If the keys are leaked at any time, all data will
probably be available for download from the network for a long time after the
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leak, and all the data will be accessible and may be decrypted by anyone with
the leaked key. For sharing where the security only depends on concealing the
identity this may be acceptable, but in such a system, using Freenet in its
original form may be sufficient. If the confidentiality of the data should be
keept secure for a limited time (for example to distribute files during a short
period without drawing attention), it may still be a good idea to use the
described approach for a private P2P Freenet. In such a setting it may be
acceptable that someone leaks the key after a while.
The Freenet is innovative with respect to its charter to fight censorship. As a
private P2P network it relies on the same principles of out of band key
exchange among peers with some form of social relationship. Depending on
the intended use by a peer, the solution may be considered very interesting or
completely unacceptable. For example, the only way to grade security with
respect to access, is to form one group which each set of peers that is supposed
to get access to a given set of files. This would imply that all peers in each
group intend to share the same ‘types’ of files with each other. For example,
five friends form one group. Two of these friends wants to share some special
files without making them available to the others, and must thus create another
group. One of these peers wants to share yet another set of special files with
another friend in the group, and thus another group must be formed. For each
created group, new keys must be exchanged out of band.
4.4.7. Tsne
In Tsne7 peers gain access to to a network by broadcasting an announce
message on a LAN. All peers who receive the announcement adds the peer to
its list of active nodes. There is no authentication mechanism, it is the trust
peers on the physical network has in each other that is the basis for the private
P2P network. When a node moves from the LAN to a different location that is
connected to the LAN but not on the LAN (for example to another LAN which
is connected to the first LAN through the internet), it will attempt to connect
with the nodes on the original LAN based on their IP address. If it is able to do
this, it will be allowed to continue to participated in the private P2P network.
The peer is recognized by its node ID, a string selected by each individual
peer.
Peers only connect to peers they have met on the LAN. To increase the
number of available resources in the network, peers will forward the search to
all its connected peers. In this way, peers who are searching for content will
have access to the content of its peers, and their peers’ peers.
                                                
7 Tsne is the system which will be used as a basis for the implementation. It is described in
greater detail in the next chapter, and even more technical details are discussed in the design
and implementation chapters.
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The greatest feature of the Tsne network is its autonomy. Moments after the
application is started for the first time, the peer is automatically connected to
all peers on its LAN. Over time the network builds lists of locations for peers
that are not always connected directly on the LAN but rather from remote IP
addresses on other locations, and even track dynamic addresses that do not
change too often quite effectively. This autonomy is a disadvantage when it
comes to keeping the network private.
There is no authentication in Tsne. Because of this the private P2P network is
very susceptible to spoofing. An attacker spoofing a node ID will be granted
access to all resources in the network . All peers and even an attacker who is
able to listen in on the traffic (which is always unencrypted) going to a single
node, will be able to listen in on searches, and retrieve the node IDs of all
currently connected nodes (which may later be used for spoofing). In addition
to this, the resources are made available by a separate port opened by Tsne.
Tsne runs a web server on  this port, and will serve any shared resource to
anyone who connects. The formatting requests for resources is well known,
and an attacker may easily gain access by requesting files identified by a
numeric ID starting at 0 and incremented every time new content is added by
the sharing peer.
Finally there is no mechanism for grading access. All peers are either part of
the network or not. Peers in the network are granted full access to searching
and files.
4.5. Specifying the challenges
As the review of current private P2P networks shows, there are some general
challenges related to grading of the security. First of all, nodes need to be
authenticated. With proper authentication, a network has more information to
use for grading security, for example grading access.
As part of authentication there has to be a mechanism for exchanging keys. As
we see, common solutions use out of band channels or concepts like web of
trust or adaptations of this. All of these approaches has its greatest challenge
when exchanging keys for the first time, especially when a new invited peer is
joining the network. It will be attempted to find a suitable mechanism for
exchanging a key, and for associating it with an identity. Trust is an important
aspect of authentication, so it should be looked into how trust may be used in
the setting of key exchange and authentication.
When a peer is authenticated, access may be graded based on many
parameters. It is evident that peers using private P2P networks wants to restrict
access to resources for one reason or the other. It will be attempted to find a
suitable solution for grading access to resources. In this context grading access
could generally be interpreted as granting different peers access to different
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shared files. However it will be attempted to make the solution suitable for
resources on a general level, not only files.
The impression of the author is that all the current private P2P networks has
problems with finding a solution which retains the favorable autonomy of a
regular P2P network, while providing the control of a private P2P network.
The private P2P networks seems to either have a very strict control and a low
autonomy, or little control (or is at least very vulnerable to attacks)  and high
autonomy. It will be attempted to find a solution which provides strict control
while keeping the autonomy more intact than in current private P2P
technologies, and thus merge the two P2P concepts closer together,  keeping
the best of both and maybe even adding some features.
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5. The Sozialized.net Embedded – An existing private
peer-to-peer solution with limited levels of security
5.1. The Sozialized.net Embedded (Tsne) as a starting point
As previously stated, the implementation of Tsne was going to be used as an
example of a private P2P network without differentiated levels of security.
This implementation was to be explored, and based on the research in the
previous chapters, a restructured design would be developed. The goal of the
restructured design would be to introduce mechanisms for differentiated levels
of security in the Tsne system, preferably retaining much of the autonomy of
the original design. In this chapter we describe the design of the original Tsne
private P2P network. This chapter is based mainly on inspection of the source
code of Tsne, snooping of traffic which the Tsne network transmits,
experimentation with the application, and the insight that came with making
the revised version as part of the developed test system. Resources[21,22]
written by its creator, Njål Borch, has also been very helpful in researching its
operation.
5.2. Overview of Tsne
Tsne is a P2P file sharing application which allows peers to share mp3 files.
On the networking and file sharing level the system operates autonomously, or
in other words, Tsne discovers peers and adds them to the private network
without the interaction of the users of Tsne. Tsne does not rely on a centralized
nor a decentralized authority to allow peers to connect to a network or to each
other. Instead a Tsne peer builds a network of peers it meets on different LAN
networks it is connected to.
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Figure 3: Example of topology of a private P2P network without a centralized
server
Figure 3 shows a typical topology of a small Tsne network. The peers stores
the IP addresses of the peers they interact with. If these IP addresses are
publicly accessible addresses, a peer that migrates to another network is able
to reconnect with a peer that is still on the LAN where they met. The new IP
address of the migrated peer (in addition to the IP address it recently had on
the LAN) is stored in the peer that did not move. If the unmoved peer also
moves at this time, it is able to connect to the peer that moved first, because it
already knows its new IP address. As this process continues, the peers
continually build a private network which maps different selections of IP
addresses as possible locations of given peers. When a node responds to a
probe at a given IP address, it is considered active (in contrast to the
alternative state of being offline). An active node may then be used by the peer
to search for mp3 files. The active node will return a compiled list of URL
references to mp3 files on the active node itself and on all nodes the active
node has currently registered as active. The searching peer will compile its
own list of URL references, this list consists of mp3 files the searching peer it
self is sharing, and the responses from all its active peers. This compiled list of
URLs to mp3 resources is then passed to the peers media player, and the
media player will begin to play the mp3 by streaming the files. Just to clarify it
is noted that the files that are being streamed, are located on any of these
locations:
• The searching peer itself
• An active peer that has responded with a compiled list of URLs and
the URL that is being streamed is located on this active peer’s
system
• A node that is not known to the searching peer, but an active peer
that is known to the searching peer has returned a compiled list of
URLs, and the URL that is being streamed references this unknown
peer.
The streaming itself is handled by a simple web server which is implemented
in Tsne. The web server has no restrictions and will serve any shared8 resource
to any entity which requests it. There is no control of which peers are allowed
to connect to the private network or to the web server. In addition there is no
control over which of the shared resources the peers (or other probing entities)
get access to. In this way, any online entity which is capable of following the
                                                
8 The web server selects which file to serve by parsing the request looking for a resource
identification. This identification is used to do a look up in the web servers database. The
database contains a mapping between resource identifications and shared files. The web server
will thus only serve files which are identified by a resource identification.
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http protocol could download any file from any peer in the private network by
simply probing the http servers and requesting random resource
identifications.
5.3. The inner workings of the original Tsne
In this section we take a closer look at the inner workings of the original Tsne.
Based on the research in the previous chapters and our examination of Tsne
we will use the next chapter to identify sections of the code where it may be
possible to introduce some of the different levels of security we have
discussed. In the next chapter we will consider which of these are suitable for
alterations or additions without changing the original idea of Tsne. Or in other
words, we will attempt to introduce levels of security while keeping the
autonomy of the system as intact as possible.
5.3.1. Announce – peer announcing its presence (neighbor discovery)
The basic operation of a private P2P network is a mechanism for discovering
and registering peers. In Tsne this is handled by socializing with nodes on a
LAN and the process is as follows:
To start Tsne, tsne.py is executed without parameters. By doing so, all
peers running Tsne uses the module neighbord (neighbor discovery)  to
open a server socket on a predefined port and starts listening for
incoming network traffic. We will call this part of the system for the
daemon.
All Tsne peers will periodically broadcast9 an Announce10 message to
this same port, announcing their presence on the LAN, their random
user identification (ID) and the implied intention to participate as a
peer.
Any Tsne peer which receives this broadcast announcement will check
the user ID against its database to see if this is a new peer or a peer it
has met before. If it has not seen it before the new peer is added to the
database with the source IP address of the broadcast, if it has seen the
ID before the source IP address of the broadcast is added  as another
possible address of this ID.
                                                
9 Tsne was actually written supporting IPv6 link local multicasts, the equivalent of IPv4
broadcasts. The restructured design uses IPv4 broadcasts, and thus the two will not be
differentiated in this setting.
10 The word Announce is the first line of the message (just like GET is the first line of a http
request) and indicates to Tsne which subroutine should be called to handle the incoming
message.
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This means that any Tsne peer on a LAN network or migrating between
different LAN networks, for example at work, a university, a WLAN hot spot
or similar, will socialize with other Tsne peers and gradually populate its
database with a list of IDs and associated IP addresses.
5.3.2. Ping Pong – Keeping track of active peers at ‘any’ location
The database of peers a given peer has meet will continue to grow each time it
meets a new peer in this way. To maintain a list of peers that are available
when a given peer connects to a network, a pinging scheme is used:
All peers running Tsne uses the module neighbord (neighbor
discovery) to open a socket on a predefined port and starts listening for
incoming network traffic (the same port that listens for the
announcements mentioned above)
All peers will continuously check the database entries for each of the
peers they have met and examine the timestamp of their last contact
with any given peer.
• A very recent timestamp indicates an active peer
• A recent but older than a few seconds indicates an active
but stale peer.
• A timestamp which is older than approximately one minute
indicates an offline peer.
Stale and offline peers will be sent a ping. Stale peers are pinged on the
IP address they are currently active on, while offline peers are pinged
on all known previous IP addresses. When a pong is received the
timestamp will be updated (and thus the peer will be considered active
again). If a given peer does not respond with a pong, the timestamp
will eventually expire (or the timestamp is already expired), and the
peer is considered offline.
When a peer receives a ping with the ID of a peer it has meet before, the
source IP address of this ping is added to the database as a possible address of
this ID (if it is different than the previously stored IP addresses of this ID). If
we look at two peers, and both peers leave the LAN at the same time, they will
not be able to reconnect  until they are both on the LAN at the same time
again. However, if one of the peers move to a new IP address (at home, an
office or similar) and pings the peer which has remained on the LAN,  the
LAN peer will then know two possible addresses of the peer that moved. If the
LAN peer then moves to another IP address, it will attempt to ping the peer
that moved first on both its known locations. Given that the first peer has not
moved again, receiving a ping with the ID of a peer it has seen before, will
update the database with another location to connect to the peer with this ID. If
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the networks are suitable the peers will still be able to connect11 even though
they have both moved to new IP addresses. As the peers move around, it will
become more and more likely that a peer, which moves to a new IP address,
will have the current IP address of the peer it is trying to ping among its list of
previously known IP addresses for this peer.
5.3.3. File searching and sharing
The private P2P network ,with its announcements, pings and pongs, is the
backbone of Tsne. The objective of Tsne is to share resources, specifically
mp3 files12. Mp3 files are located through a distributed search among the
peers, and searched files are available for streaming to anyone who is
participating in the private network (or pretending to participate, but more on
this later).
Tsne handles searches and streaming of resources through a built in web
server which supports a sub set of the http specification. The details are as
follows:
When Tsne is executed without parameters, it uses the module network
(web server) to start a web server (in addition to the neighbord daemon
explained in the previous section) on a given port.
A user executes Tsne with ‘-- play’ as a parameter, followed by one or
several search terms. The search terms would typically be one or
several artists, song titles, music genres13 or similar. For example
                                                
11 Connectivity is a complicated issue. Tsne relies on traffic flowing in both directions directly
between two peers. If one of the peers is behind a firewall or a router which does not allow the
incoming traffic to pass or does not allow server sockets, one peer may see the other as active,
while the other peer sees the first as offline. Similar problems will be observed if one of the
peers are on a network which uses NAT when assigning IP addresses to network adapters that
are present on the LAN. Solutions for this problem are considered beyond the scope of this
thesis and relates to the original design of Tsne and its intended use.
12 Tsne is programmed to share mp3 files, but it is noted that rewriting Tsne to share any
resource that may be represented as a read only stream is by the author of this paper
considered trivial (this does not imply anything about the amount of time it would take to
perform the actual rewrite). Because Tsne operation is based on searching, the streams should
have meaningful search parameters associated with them.
13 During testing of the original Tsne it was noticed that searches seemed to only return
resources where some or all search terms matched tokens in the file names of resources.
Tsne’s database, which is used to do the search, is designed to create a mapping between
given resources and searchable tokens in the file name, but also between given resources and
tokens in the ID3 tag for the given resource. The searchability of the ID3 tag is considered
insignificant for this thesis and thus the reason for this problem was not explored. It is
however noted that Tsne either has a bug in its handling or searching of the ID3 tag, or the test
system had a compatibility problem with the original Tsne code. This problem carries over to
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tsnecv.py --play Morten Abel Inparticular
Tsne then sends a http query request to the local instance of the Tsne
web daemon, with the search terms as part of the query.
The query originating from the peer itself is handled in the same way a
query from any other peer would be handled. The web server performs
a search among the local resources and compiles a list of URL
references which contains its own IP address and the assigned resource
ID of all (if any) resources which match the search keywords. The web
daemon then passes the same query to all active peers listed in its
database (and because all peers are running Tsne this is repeated
throughout the private P2P network). This results in a flooded
distributed search, and the local web server will add all timely search
responses to its list of URLs that references resources which match the
search terms. Finally, the local web daemon will return a http response
with its list to Tsne (which as we remember was called with --play as a
parameter and is not to be confused with the Tsne daemons that are
running the Tsne system itself).
Tsne will store the transmitted list and then execute the operating
system’s default media player or the mpeg123 media player if the
environment variable for media player isn’t configured. When
executing the media player, path to the stored compiled list of URL
references is passed as a parameter.
The media player interprets this as a regular play list (which it in fact
is), and begins to stream the mp3 resources like it would any other
resource. The media player sends a http get request to the given IP
addresses in the play list, with the resource ID where one would
‘usually’ see a file name (i.e.
http://158.39.41.256:3074/resource?id=1329 14 ).
The respective network daemons on the peers that are referenced will
then respond by streaming the resource their database has associated
with the resource ID.
                                                                                                                               
the implementation of the revised Tsne, and thus the revised version is also only able to search
the file names of resources, not the ID3 tag. This may or may not be the case for any other test
system which experiment with the revised version.
14 Note that identical resource IDs has different associations on different peers. Also note that
this example IP address is non existent.
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5.4. Levels of security in the original Tsne
In the next chapter we will explore the levels of security that Tsne does not
have and the levels that based on our research are considered desirable to
attempt to introduce. This is a large topic and is more suitable for discussion in
the design of the revised version of Tsne. In this short section however, we
will briefly mention the few levels of implied security that Tsne already has
and a few obvious problems related to this.
In Tsne any peer which is present on a LAN network with another peer is
autonomously added to the list of peers. Peers has no means of accepting or
rejecting these added peers. It is possible to clear all peers but not just one
single peer (even though this would be trivial to implement). The problem is
however, that even if a peer is deleted it will immediately be added again if it
is still on the same LAN, or even if it ever sends a ping to an IP address that
the deleting peer is at.
Resources on a Tsne system  are either shared or not shared. Typically one or
several folders containing mp3s are imported into Tsne and made available for
searching and streaming. Any peer which is active will have access to all
shared resources (actually even a hostile peer pretending to be offline would
have the same access, but more on this in the next chapter).
The implied security that we associate with Tsne is that users on a LAN may
be peers that other peers on the same LAN choose to trust somewhat more
than random peers on other locations on the Internet. There are many problems
related to this implied security and they will be discussed and attempted to be
resolved in the revised version. A few of the related problems are as follows:
If  Tsne is used on a laptop, it will typically intermittently be connected
to both LANs with peers one would choose to trust and LANs with
complete strangers, and there is no mechanism for differentiating
between these.
If there were a mechanism for differentiating between peers(for
example a trivial revision allowing manual approval or disapproval of
the addition of peers)  there would still be no way to authenticate an
approved peer connecting remotely at another time.
Even on a LAN with peers one would normally trust, there is no
mechanism for excluding or limiting access to resources for known
hostile peers, nor is there a mechanism for granting selected peers
access to specific restricted resources.
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6. Specification and design
6.1. The Sosialized.Net Embedded - Cryptographic Version, an envisioned
private peer-to-peer solution with graded levels of security
As part of the research in this thesis, Tsne was revised to support grading of
security. In the following section the specification of the expected security of
the revised version is specified. The specification was used to create a design
for the revised version, The Sosialized.Net Embedded - Cryptographic Version
(Tsnecv). This design was the basis for the implementation of Tsnecv,
described in chapter 7 of this thesis. The design shows the features the system
should be able to simulate. In the implementation some of the features are
handled directly by the system, while others are handled by manipulating the
database entries for peers in the system.
6.2. Specification of Tsnecv
This section specifies the conditions that defines the expected operation and
security of Tsnecv. All the conditions had to be fulfilled to achieve what is
considered a secure system. The consideration of secure only applies to the
level of security that is implicitly provided by the specification.. Truly Secure
Cryptographic systems are large and complicated, and are only as strong as
their weakest link. The focus of this thesis was grading of security, and the
features that were selected were selected to achieve or demonstrate that such
grading is possible, not to make the system as a whole completely secure from
every possible attack. As an example, the research that has been done has
described known cryptographic systems which has shown that if entities are
authenticated, it is also possible to create a secure channel. This realization
was used to select authentication as a feature of the specification. In a truly
secure cryptographic system the authenticated peer would use a secure channel
to retrieve a file, and the file would thus only be readable by the authenticated
peer. According to the following specification we choose to ignore that the file
must be accessed on a secure channel, and only require that a peer must be
authenticated before access is granted to the file. This allowed us to focus on
how the authentication and other aspects of trust might be used to grade
security by giving selective access to files. According to the specification the
implementation is what is considered to be secure in the setting of this thesis.
This does not however imply that the system as a whole is truly secure in a
real world setting.
6.2.1. Specification
The following specification of the systems behavior aimed to autonomously
but cryptographically secure grant access to any new peers, while allowing
peers to share some (if any) files with all peers and selected files with selected
groups of peers (where a group may possibly contain just 1 peer).
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The application shall be able to execute on a Windows XP 32 bit computer
system with a LAN adapter, connected to a LAN, where other instances of the
application, executing on other Windows XP 32 bit computers, may join and
leave at their own discretion.
The network shall function while connected to the Internet, not just in a test
laboratory.
Peers must be authenticated in  a cryptographic secure manner  before they
are allowed to participate in the private network.
If a peer is authenticated and is believed to reside at a given IP address, it is
not considered a breach of security if an entity uses the unsecured channel of
the web server (which every peer makes available to other peers through
Tsnecv) to gain access to resources by spoofing the given IP or acting as a
man in the middle making Tsnecv believe that the authenticated peer resides
on the attackers IP address.
A session key which could be used to create a secure channel shall be
exchanged during authentication. This key should be exchanged to
demonstrate that the secure channel is available even though it is not used
when downloading files.
The quality of external cryptographic libraries shall not be considered a part
of the systems level of security.
All peers on a LAN shall be able to join the network autonomously.
All peers shall have the option of making selected resources available to all
peers.
All new peers shall be able to autonomously provide their key to existing peers
by in band communication
All peers shall have the option of obtaining or confirming keys of other peers
through a mutual peer which of both trust the public key completely, if such a
mutual peer exist.
All peers shall have the option of manually confirming keys and then to
increase their trust in the key associated with the peer.
All peers shall have the option of manually increasing their trust in the key
associated with a peer without manually confirming the key.
Tsnecv shall autonomously assign trust to a new peer in the network based on
how the public key of the peer is obtained.
Tsnecv shall autonomously give authenticated peers access to files shared to
specific groups of peers based on how much trust is associated with the key
identifying the authenticated peer.
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All peers shall have the option of making selected resources available to only
a selected group, of which at least one group should be used to represent the
peers a single person is the owner of. The number of separate groups is not
important, but it should be at least 5, and a group should be able to contain
zero or more peers.
6.3. Design of Tsnecv
If we look back at chapter four where suitable technologies were discussed,
the following aspects of security were identified:
Authentication (origin Integrity) - Which entity is communicating
Data integrity - Is the data unchanged
Confidentiality (access) - restricted access to data, or at least restricted
access in the form of only selected entities being able to decrypt data
that is visible to all(meaningless to all others)
Secrecy - Is the communication invisible to others
Availability - Is the data available when an entity requires access
When we designed a revised version of Tsne we had to consider which of
these were desirable for the intended purpose of Tsne. We also had to consider
which of these might be implemented without interfering more than necessary
with the autonomy which is a founding concept in the original design. Another
very important aspect was how strong the security should be. By strong we
mean how much resources, be it computational power, bandwidth, storage or
other,  we were willing to use on a specific level of security.  For example,
looking back at authentication we remember that increased key length for a
given cryptographic algorithm generally increases the security for the
algorithm. But, generating longer keys require more computational cycles, and
decryption and encryption with longer keys also require more computational
cycles. We also note that a longer key requires more space to be stored and to
be transmitted.
6.3.1. Selected levels of security
Confidentiality in the form of access control and origin integrity in the form of
authentication has been the focus of most of this research. The research show
that these are levels of security that are considered desirable by most of the
private P2P networks. For the intended private use of Tsne they are definitely
considered to increase the security level of the network.
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6.3.2. Selected encryption algorithms and bit strength
6.3.2.1. Symmetric encryption with AES
For algorithms in Tsnecv which rely on symmetric encryption, the leading
standard AES was selected. The algorithm has been determined to be secure
by a broad base of researchers, some of these have been referenced in chapter
four. 3DES and Serpent were considered, but AES was selected both because
of its standardization and its presence in the elected cryptographic package.
6.3.2.2. Asymmetric encryption, signatures and authentication with RSA
For algorithms in Tsnecv which relies on asymmetric encryption, the leading
standard RSA was selected. The algorithm has been determined to be secure
by a broad base of researchers, some of these have been referenced in chapter
four. Elliptic Curve Cryptography was also considered due to its use of shorter
keys to achieve the same bit strength as RSA. There are two reasons why
ECC was not selected. First of all, there was no readily available or renowned
implementation of ECC with could be incorporated directly with Python.
Implementing ‘just’ ECC for python is by the author considered far beyond
the scope of this thesis . The second reason was that RSA is, even though it is
very secure, based on mathematical concepts which are covered by the
mandatory mathematical courses leading up to this thesis. As a result the
author is able to understand how it works, and thus reduce the risk of using it
incorrectly (which is a serious threat in all cryptographic systems).
6.3.2.3. Selected bit strength of RSA and AES
According to RSA Laboratories[24], 1024 bits is currently considered
sufficient for corporate (including online transactions) use, but the security is
expected to be breached in the not so distant future. A bit length of at least
1024 bits should be used, but if testing determines that a regular home
computer is able to efficiently use stronger keys (e.g. 2048 or 3072)without
dramatically impacting performance, stronger keys should be used. It must be
noted that there should be a correlation between strength of the symmetric
keys used and the RSA keys, in order for the increase to truly increase the
security as much as intended . The following table shows the relationship
between RSA bit length and symmetric bit strength according to RSA
Laboratories.
RSA 1024 Symmetric 80 bit
RSA 2048 Symmetric 112 bit
RSA 3072 Symmetric 128 bit
Table 1 - Correlation of RSA key bit lengths and bit security of symmetric block algorithms
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6.3.3. Encryption module
An external library which implements the selected cryptographic algorithms
was used. The following modules were designed to encapsulate access to the
cryptographic functions:
6.3.3.1. crypformat
Helper functions which converts tuples of strings to one single string which
may then be encrypted and decrypted (by another module), and converted
back to the same tuple in a predictable fashion.
6.3.3.2. crypglobals
A static file which only contains variables used to configure the operation of
the cryptographic system.
6.3.3.3. crypdocrypto
Helper functions which was designed to perform the actual cryptographic
functions by using a publicly available cryptographic implementation of RSA
and AES. If the selected cryptographic algorithms are exchanged for similar
ones, this should be the only module that must be rewritten extensively (even
though its format should not need to change).
6.3.4. Authentication and key exchange module
The existing module in Tsne neighbord (neighbor discovery) is in Tsnecv
responsible for initiating authentication and key exchange based on expired or
non existent authentication state for a connecting peer. The actual work is
carried out by the protocol part of the module.
6.3.4.1. neighbord (neighbor discovery)
The operation of the original neighbord module is specified in chapter 5.3.1
and 5.3.2. The revised version in Tsnecv was designed to uses a scheme
similar to the existing Ping - Pong scheme used for discovery. Just like there is
a timeout for nodes becoming stale or offline, the redesigned version was
designed to use a timeout for the authentication process. The design specifies
that Authenticated nodes be registrerd as AUTHACTIVE. When the timeout
(typically configured to be 60 seconds) expires an authenticated node should
be flagged as AUTHSTALE, an soon after it should be flagged as
AUTHEXPIRED. Active and stale peer(in terms of Ping - Pong) which are not
AUTHACTIVE should be authenticated again. This solution was selected
because access to the web server does not use a secure channel. Because a peer
may be contacted by anyone on the last known IP address a peer has
connected to, it was necessary to combine the authentication with a timeout.
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Just like Pinging, this could be viewed as an implementation of presence, ie
actively polling peers to confirm they are still connected. The only difference
is that the ‘authentication ping’ includes a mechanism for authentication. To
perform the authentication the design specifies that a crypprotocol object is to
be instantiated in a manner that represents an authentication protocol.
6.3.4.2. crypprotocol
Class that defines variables needed to perform all the protocols. One object of
this class should be created every time a protocol is initiated. It was designed
to use separate protocol objects for every connection to another peer where
either an authentication or key exchange was initiated, and even one separate
protocol object for each protocol it was involved in with the same peer. The
progress through the protocol was designed to be controlled by repeatedly
requesting each object to continue to the next step of the protocol if possible
after checking the internal state of the protocol object.
6.3.4.3. crypprotocolgetunsecurekey
The algorithm was designed to handle the protocol for the unsecure public
exchange of a relatively  untrusted key. The exchange design allowed in band
exchange over an unsecure channel.
6.3.4.4. crypprotocolgetsecurekey
The algorithm was designed to handle the protocol for the secure exchange of
a relatively  trusted key through a common trusted peer.
6.3.4.5. crypprotocolauth
The algorithm was designed to handle the protocol for the authentication of
any peer, using the known public key of the peer (whether the key is trusted or
not). A key is always obtainable from a peer that is attempting to connect
(because it may be retrieved unsecurely). Being authenticated does not imply
that a peer is identified, it only establishes a relation between a public key and
an assumed identity, which may be used in future communications to identify
this assumed identity. The trust Tsnecv or the peer has in this key and assumed
identity grades the security of the authentication from nearly zero, to complete
trust and  absolute security equal to that of the encryption algorithms used and
the correctness of the implementations of these algorithms and the Tsnecv
protocols.
6.3.4.6. crypprotocolspinner
This algortihm was designed as a very simple helper function which should
continuously poll to check if a message has been received from the network,
and then use crypselecter to determine which protocol object the message is
designated for.
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6.3.4.7. crypselecter
This algorithm was designed as a helper function which should examine
incoming authentication and key exchange communication to determine which
protocol object is responsible for handling the communication, based on the
source IP address of the communication.
6.3.5. Access module
As Tsne was an existing system, access was not handled as a separate module.
Access was designed to be handled by querying stored information about
authenticated nodes. These queries are performed in the existing web server
module by accessing the database module. The only helper function the design
relied on was crypauth.
6.3.5.1. crypauth
Helper functions designed to access stored information about the system, to
determine which groups a peer is associated with, and which specific
resources these groups has access to.
6.3.5.2. network (web server)
The operation of the original network module is specified in chap 5.3.. The
revised version in Tsnecv was designed to enforce the specified access policies
which will be described in section 6.3.5.3 (next section) and section 6.3.6. As
stated in the specification for Tsnecv, a secure channel is not required to
access resources on the web server. The web server in the original Tsne does
not limit access to the web server to peers in the network. Because of this, no
mechanism was in place to handle access restrictions in the revised version.
The revised version limits access in two ways. The web server has been
redesigned to use the IP address of the request as an identifier. The web server
is designed to only allow access to resources to authenticated nodes (as
maintained in the data base by the neighbor discovery). In addition, the web
server was designed to use the crypauth helper function to determine which
groups the authenticated peer was associated with. Based on the permissions
of the groups the peer is a member of, access is graded. A peer is only allowed
access to resources which at least one of its groups has been granted access to.
As an additional feature, the web server was designed to provide a resource
other than the mp3 files supported by the original Tsne. A special request to
the web server allows a peer to request the host machine of the web server to
perform a regular search as a peer, and play the resulting play list directly on
the host machine. Peers are supposed to only add peers they control (or maybe
household members) to the two special groups which are allowed to obtain
remote access to this functionality. This was done mainly to illustrate one use
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of graded security with respect to access in a peer to peer network, beyond that
of limiting access in a file sharing private P2P network.
6.3.6. Trust for autonomously granting access
The proposed solution for autonomously granting access in Tsnecv was is to
grade the trust of  a public key and its associated user ID. The graded trust was
then used to grade access to resources according to the autonomously assigned
trust. The assignment of trust was done by the neighbord discovery, and
enforced by the web server.
The system was designed to assign trust in the following way:
A peer connecting for the first time, which is only able to provide its public
key and alleged identity by in band communication should be assigned a trust
level of 1, the lowest trust possible (other than 0 which isn’t used, but would
imply that the connecting peer is not even using Tsnecv but rather performing
a port scan or some other form of probing). A Tsnecv network consisting of
such peers only, would represent a regular P2P network, not a private P2P
network. Peers with trust level 1 were autonomously granted access to files
shared to group 1. Adding resources to group 1 is done at Bob’s discretion, so
Bob does not have to participate in this sharing of resources. The peers of this
type is considered anonymous peers.
A key with trust level one may be upgraded to a trusted key by a peer. The
upgrade is done at the peer’s discretion. This means that the peer has the
choice of either manually confirming the received key by out of band
communication with a friend. The peer may also select to use his knowledge
and compare the supplied identity of a connecting peer with information about
a friend. The peer must then decide if it trusts the network and the exchange of
the key. For example, if Bob and Alice are sitting in a room, connected to each
other through a switch, Bob will observe someone who is identifying
themselves as something like ‘CoolAlice<and a cryptographic secure random
number>’. The probability of someone acting as man in the middle to forge
the key in this setting would usually be considered minimal15 , and Bob may
                                                
15 This is a consideration that must be made by the user. Two regular peers connected to a
switch on a LAN they trust, are very unlikely to be under attack. If however these two peers
were likely to be subjected to industrial espionage or maybe even peers sharing military
defense information, extraordinary precautions would have to be taken. These peers would
have to consider the possibility of secret agents infiltrating the building, exchanging the switch
with a specially designed switch under their control, which would allow them remote access
and the possibility to change the content of messages, while acting as man in the middle. This
indicates that security is relative. For the average peer, considerations such as switches and
routers with firmware with security holes are a greater threat, as this may allow hackers to
perform the same operation as those described with the secret agent (and secret agents may of
course also use hackers)
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select to upgrade this key to trusted. To manually trust the key implies that
Bob knows Alice, so upgrading the key also upgrades Alice to become a
friend. Friends with confirmed keys are autonomously granted access to
resources shared to group 7, 5, 3 and 1.
Bob also has the option of manually upgrading an assumed ‘key to identity’
binding for Alice to become a friend without upgrading his trust in the key.
Such an upgrade implies that Bob is quite certain it really is Alice, but until it
is confirmed he is not quite as willing to share resources as he will be when
the binding is confirmed (by himself or other peers). The manual upgrade to
friend but with untrusted key autonomously grants the friend access to
resources shared to group 5, 3 and 1. If Tsnecv is at a later time able to have
the key confirmed by another friend with a secure connection, the key is
upgraded to trusted and the friend is granted the additional  access of resources
shared with group 7 (so total access is 7, 5, 3 and 1)
Friends of friends (FoF) are handled in two ways. If Alice is a friend of Bob,
and Bob has a trusted key to Alice, Tsnecv trusts Alice’s judgment and
autonomously grants FoFs that reach Bob through Alice access to files shared
to group 3 and 1. Adding resources to group 3 is done at Bob’s discretion, so
Bob does not need to rely in the judgement of his friends even though Tsnecv
does so. If Bob does not have a trusted key to Alice, Tsnecv autonomously
treats the FoFs who reach  him through Alice the same way he treats
anonymous peers.
It is noted that if the friend of a friend with an unconfirmed key connects to
the same LAN as Bob, this friend of friend would autonomously be treated as
a peer connecting for the first time, and thus be autonomously granted access
to the resources of group 1.
The first time Tsnecv is started, it adds itself to group 9. This is a special
reserved group which has access to the resources of all other groups. There is
another reserved group, group 8. Peers may only be added manually to group 8
and 9 (except for the described addition to group 9 when the system is
initialized for the first time). Group 8, like 9, has access to the resources of all
other groups. Group 8 is reserved for what should be considered a house hold
or similar. The group is used to share a special resource, the ability to invoke
remote playing of mp3 files.  In a typical configuration, a peer will add all its
devices to group 9 and have access to private files shared among its devices in
group 9. Household members, such as a media PC in the living room is added
to group 8, allowing different members of a household to share music to group
8 and invoke the remote play function of the media PC in the living room from
any peer they have added to the media players group 8. The media player is
not able to play music shared to group 9. The media PC operates as any other
peer in the system, so the members of the household must use the Tsnecv
running on it to add their peers to the media players group 8.
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The special groups with negative numbers, -9 through -1 could be used by a
peer to make specific files available to a specific group of peers. The members
of each group could be added manually by the sharing peer from the list of
available peers in the network. These groups would be intended for friends,
and would require members to be friends with trusted keys.
Information used for autonomous grading of peer




FRIEND with confirmed/trusted key 7
FRIEND with unconfirmed/untrusted key 5
FoF through FRIEND with confirmed/trusted key 3
Anonymous peer with any key 1
FoF through FRIEND with unconfirmed/untrusted key 1
All others (probing, protocol errors etc) 0
Figure 2: Table of autonomous access. FoF is a friend of a friend, FRIEND is
a friend. Group 0 implies no access.
6.3.7. Important manual operations in Tsnecv
The following operation was designed to configure Tsnecv
• Select a nick name which will be recognizable by friends.
The following operations were designed to allow peers to control the
managment of their trust in other peers.
• Upgrade to friend by trusting key.
• Upgrade to friend but do not trust key.
Add peer to group 8 or 9.
• Delete peer to reset all info, but allow to reconnect as a new peer.
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7. Implementation
7.1. Implementing The Sosialized.net Embedded -  Cryptographic Version
In this chapter the actual implementation of Tsnecv, the revised version of
Tsne, is described. It will show which mechanisms are used to fulfill the
requirements of the specification of the required security stated in chapter 6 of
this thesis. It will be demonstrated that the requirements were met, or if the
attempt to implement a specific feature was not successful the problems
leading to failure will be explored.
The algorithms will be discussed in general terms, for details the reader will be
referred to the source code which is a part of the deliverables for this thesis.
7.2. Preparation, tools, System software and hardware setup
7.2.1.1. Hardware
Because it was planned to use a Windows Mobile Wlan capable phone, it was
decided to use Windows as the development platform. To make sure the
system would really work as described, in the real world, a setup resembling a
typical system (except for the few number of nodes) was used. 2 machines
were connected to a switch. These machines were connected to the Internet
through the Internet line of the switchand were assigned public IP addressed.
A laptop was connected to the Internet line from a completely different
network segment (two separate Internet providers, HiTos/Uninett and
Bluecom). As both lines were available in the same room, the real life
situation of a peer moving to a new network could be tested by plugging the
network cable back and forth between the switch or the separate ADSL line.
The Bluecom line was completely open (no firewalls or NAT), but the Uninett
line had a very limited selection of ports which were open for incoming traffic,
so the Tsnecv configuration files were set to use these open ports.
7.2.1.2. Software
The development was done in XEmacs. The application that was to be furter
developed, Tsne, was available in Python, and Tsnecv was thus naturally
developed in Python . Two Sourceforge projects were used: PYsqlite was used
as the database, and pYcrypto[25,26] was used by algorithms which had use
for cryptographic functions. pYcrypto is a quite low level interface and
implementation which mainly contains the ciphering mechanisms and key
generation. Functionality like padding, Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)[6,27],
and signature verifications had to be implemented separately. The binaries for
these two projects are a part of project’s code delivery, along with the source
code of both Tsne and the developed Tsnecv
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7.3. Overview of the important modules of Tsnecv
The Tsne code was well structured, but communication in the neighbor
discovery was based on a ‘fire and forget’ concept. A peer would send a Ping
and forget all about it. Later it would probably receive a Pong, and update a
timestamp for the last contact with whoever was pinged. This approach is a
good implementation of a ping, but complicates cryptographic protocols.
Authentication and key exchange is usually done by sending several messages
back and forth. This is usually done in a connected mode where the two parties
maintain a channel throughout the process.
Because the neighbor discovery uses connectionless communication it was
decided to use the same for the authentication protocols. This was done in
order to follow the original design of Tsne, even though additional steps would
have to be taken. Several helper functions had to be implemented in order to
resolve issues related to the connectionless operation. The main issues were to
maintain and update the state of each step in the authentication or key
exchange, while directing incoming protocol messages to the object which was
involved with exactly that message. At a single point in time, Tsnecv may
have several active protocol objects. For example, 20 objects which are
authenticating 20 different peers and a few objects which are attempting to
exchange keys. This will lead to at least the same number of messages, but
they will arrive in no particular order, on the same port. While waiting for
responses, the objects must also handle timeouts, and resends.
7.3.1. Encryption module
The encryption is very important for the secure operation of the system.
Because of this the cryptographic module was fully implemented. It used the
pYcrypto library for the actual encryption. This library includes the actual
encryption, decryption, signing, signature verification, and key generation
algorithms. However, the framework for a cryptographic system is much more
than these functions. In the following we look at the most important classes in
the module.
crypdocrypto formats all calls to the actual cryptographic functions. It
performs functions such as padding, unpadding, conversion of data to a form
that may be encrypted, the CBC mode used with AES, and a few other
formatting functions. It also incorporated testing functions which were used to
verify the correctness of the cryptography.
crypauth was not very sophisticated, but provides a solution which may be
used to easily associate folders with groups of peers that should have access to
them. The folders holds an indicator of required access level in their path
name, and the folders may be used at both one or several levels of depth.
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crypglobals only holds configuration parameters, but is mentioned because it
allows tweaking of the protocols, particularly the behavior which is taken
when keys are missing, not trusted and so on. It also allows tweaking of the
strength of the cryptographic algorithms used in pYcrypto
7.3.2. Authentication and key exchange module
As stated earlier, the use of a ping pong scheme in Tsne’s neighbord daemon,
with connectionless communication, made cryptographic protocols a
challenge. This was solved by creating a spinning algorithm which would
continuously wake protocol objects which still hadn’t completed their task.
The protocol object is a derived class from the auth, getunsecurekey and
getsecurekey classes. This allows the protocol objects to hold all state for the
protocol which is carried out. An alteration to the neigbord daemon
implemented a spinning fucntion which continuously woke protocol objects
and allowed them to update timers and state and decide if they had timed out,
should retry, or if they had used to many attempts to without succeeding
(leading to failure). The spinner in the neighbord deamon used a similar
scheme to pinging to determine when a node should be authenticated.
The idea was that a an authenticated node should be allowed access to files for
a period of time (one minute)  after each authentication. When this was about
to expire, the node would be authenticated again, allowing it to continued
access to the system.
The individual protocol classes auth, getunsecurekey and getsecurekey had the
responsibility of defining the steps of each protocol. Get unsecure key was
implemented completely using real cryptographic keys from the encryption
module. In situations where a protocol would fail, the object would self
destruct. It would then be the responsibility of the neighbord daemon to spin a
new object after a given time had passed.
auth implemented the steps in the protocol, and would correctly abort if it did
not have the required key to authenticate. The authentication was simulated
without the use of  real kesy, and rather simulated by manipulating the
database entries or by inserting errors in the code of the test system .
The implementation of get secure key was eventually abandoned, due to an
unresolved problem with the signature verification. A manual copy of  a
signed text, transported by a removable storage device would work, but when
transmitted over the network, the signature verification would always fail.
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7.3.3. Access module
There was no access restrictions to searching. The enforcement of graded
access was handled by the network class. Based on either combinations of key
sources, status as a friend, friend of friend, the trust of the key source, or
manipulated values of these values access to files was either granted or denied.
These variables represented a combination of how much the peer trusted
whoever was connecting, and how much the peer trusted the link between a
public key and it’s assumed identity.
The required user level (or group) was determined by requesting it from the
crypauth class in the encryption module.
 In addition the network module would confirm that the authentication and key
exchange module currently considered the connecting peer to be authenticated.
If the access level of the user was sufficient the requested files would be
served. These files were served unencrypted. If the peer was not authenticated
or did not have the proper authentication, the protocol would simply abort and
not give a response in order to avoid leaking information. This is considered a
good cryptographic practice. When something fails, everything one was
working on should be shredded.
In addition to files, the network class also makes remote play available. By
requesting a particular url, the the same procedures as with file access is
followed, but only users with the two highest user levels which are currently
authenticated are granted access. If access is granted, the peer will begin to
play music locally, requested to do so by a remote peer. This access was
designed to be available for the peers own nodes in the same system, and also
for household members if so desired.
7.4. Daily use, and testing
7.4.1. Daily use
The Tsnecv network has been continuously tested throughout it’s
development. One peer has generally been used to store music, and a laptop on
the other side of the room, connected to a different network, has been used to
play music with remote play. Two friends of the author has been allowed to
test the system during its development, and it has behaved as expected
according to the stage it was at, at the time of testing. At that point and with
it’s given configuration it was able to support remote play, secured by the
knowledge of a secret key. At this point remote play is fully supported with
the exchange of keys and by adding the peer to the restricted user groups
(either 8 for household or 9 for the owner). The system is also capable of
granting peers access to files based on which user level they have. Peers who
join the network are all granted access to the lowest group autonomously
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7.4.2. Testing
7.4.2.1. Authentication
when peer x is trying to authenticate peer y, the authentication will fail if peer
y does not have peer x’s public key. The related protocol object will revert to
public key exchange. At the next attempt to authenticate, peer x will
authenticate peer y. Signatures are not tested or created by invoking them from
the encryption module, but the protocol follows the procedure. Increase of
trust may be simulated by upgrading peers to friends or household members
by accessing the database. This results in increase access
7.4.2.2. File streaming and Remote play access
The file streaming access is fully implemented. Based on the granted access
and a current authentication, only files which are supposed to be available are
made available. If a peer leaves it’s IP address, a new peer joining on the same
address will have the possibility to probe for files for up to 60 seconds, due to
the timeout of the authentication, and the unencrypted channel that is used for
transfers
7.5. Limitations and problems
The system does not use signatures, but the algorithms are implemented in the
encryption module.
The trusted key exchange was abandoned due to the problems with the
signatures.
Access is not secure with respect to the unsecure channel that is used when
transferring files.
The problems were not directly related to the protocols but rather to the
complicated nature of cryptographic systems. Debugging is extremely difficult
to perform, due to the inherent secret content of what is being debugged. The
problem is that it is not always clear at what point of a long chain of events
that something goes wrong. It is considered probable  that signatures failed
because messages were not properly formatted.
7.6. Results and possibilities and further development
The research that was done found some new ideas to grade security. The next
generation of the system should be able to implement the signatures properly,
and thus authenticate securely. If the transport channel of the web server is
encrypted according to an industry standard, it should be possible to make the
system quite secure. The grading of access proved to be very exiting. Peer who
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joined the network by appearing on a LAN, would in matter of seconds gain
access to the files made available to the lowest group. Still they would not be
able to invoke remote play or gain access to private files. As part of further
development, a detailed study of the encryption protocols should be done
8. Conclusions
It has been demonstrated that it is possible to grade security autonomously by
assigning trust to the way a key is exchanged. If a peer joins and simply shouts
his key, he gets the lowest access. If the key is manually decided to represent
his assumed identity, he may be upgraded to access more files. Only if a peer
wants to grant more access, does he need to take some form of action.
It has not been proved that the security of the system is intact. Due to the
failure of the signatures to verify authenticity , a complete chain of trust is not
reached, and the system may be breached by an attacker.
The concept seems promising. The system works and performs many of the
operations it was designed to do. The different levels of trust assigned to keys
and the ability to accept a received key based on information about who is on
the same network at that time, without manually checking the key itself, may
be found sufficient for grading security.
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